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In 2012, Hungary introduced a unique system of judicial administration that was
criticized by domestic and international actors. This criticism has been validated by
events since then which have shown that the National Judicial Council, the highest
collective body of judges, is practically unable to counter-balance the broad powers
of the President of the National Judicial Office (NJO). This has caused tensions
between judges and the judicial administration, something that was predictable in
2012 when the system was introduced and has led to what can only be described
as a ‘constitutional crisis’. The conflict between judicial self-governance and judicial
administration advanced to a European level in 2019 when the Council of the
European Union expressed its strong concerns about the powers of the Office
and recommended that judicial independence be strengthened. A previous article
analysed the preliminary request of a Hungarian judge questioning the Hungarian
court administration interfering with judicial independence; this second part will
provide insight on the background and development of this conflict.
In 1997, Hungary introduced a new court administration model in which the Council
of Justice had a leading role in all significant fields of judicial administration, including
recruitment, promotion, training of judges and budgeting. As a result, the judiciary
gained the power to administer itself, but most judges had no practical management
experience. Key positions were awarded to regional court presidents and vice-
presidents who had some experience, but their position highlighted the system’s
shortcomings and caused malfunctions in the system at an early stage (they had a
majority in the Council that was intended to supervise their activity).
Despite one-third of all Hungarian judges working in Budapest and the central
region, these courts were always underrepresented in the Council and their
problems were neglected by the judicial administration. The busiest courts struggled
with gaps in resources. The Metropolitan Court, which is the largest court in
Hungary, has almost 800 judges and the Budapest Environs Court has more than
280 judges. By comparison, in the smallest regional courts there are only 40-50
judges. Judges in the central region deal with enormous caseloads, large numbers
of high-profile cases, and work under unfavourable conditions compared to judges
in other parts of the country. This led to excessively long court proceedings and
tensions within the judiciary. Reform, therefore, was inevitable.
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The new model of court administration: a ticking
bomb
Having a constitutional majority, the Hungarian Government introduced a completely
new model in 2012 and gave the most important powers to one person, the NJO
President. The legislation argued that the newly established National Judicial
Council, consisting of 14 judges elected by their peers and the president of the
Supreme Court (Kúria), would efficiently balance the powers of the NJO President
with advisory and supervisory competences. Furthermore, the NJO President is a
judge, therefore the position should not represent a threat to judicial independence.
Unfortunately, this turned out to be a false promise. In 2011, when Ms Tünde Handó
was elected as the NJO President, there was no competitive recruitment process
for the position, Ms Handó’s plans and intentions were unknown, and there was
no judicial body that could form a prior opinion about her competences as the
Council was only established months later. The NJO President was appointed at
the discretion of the legislative, she is responsible for and may be dismissed by the
legislative body. The position can therefore be seen as closer to a political appointee
than to a judge and should be viewed as a high-ranking official of the administration.
The National Judicial Council, presented by the legislation as the balance to the
NJO President’s powers, was designed to be weak with a rotating presidency (the
head of council changes every 6 months), the ‘de jure’ independent but ‘de facto’
inaccessible budget, and a lack of staff members. The efficiency of the Council is
further weakened as several members of the Council are court leaders who are
directly or indirectly subservient to the NJO President, whom the Council should
supervise. Between 2012 and 2018, the Council Secretariat was run by a close staff
member of Ms Handó, and the Council agenda seemed to be compiled by the NJO
President (who only has consultative rights in the meetings). During this period, Ms
Handó practically acted as chair of the body which allowed her to appoint judicial
leaders with no local support (one of the few real powers of the Council is to allow
appointments when local judges don’t support the candidate).
In Hungary, regional court presidents have an enormous influence on judges.
They can initiate disciplinary proceedings, they can decide on bonuses and extra
remuneration, they make the final decision in judges’ evaluation processes, they
make decisions about judges’ working conditions, and make decisions related to
the case allocation. Cases shall be allocated randomly according to a scheme
published beforehand, but there is still no automated case allocation system in
Hungary, therefore court leaders assign cases manually. Because of their great
influence, court presidents are crucial stakeholders in court administration. To
compensate for the broad powers they hold, the law regulates that court presidents
shall be appointed by open application where applicants need to present their aims
and objectives. All judges in the relevant court then vote in a secret ballot to elect
the president. The NJO President can only appoint the candidate with most of the
supportive votes, but only if the candidate has more than 50% support. A candidate
that does not meet these criteria shall only be appointed with the Council’s approval.
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Unfortunately, there is also a loophole as the NJO President can annul the
application even if there is a suitable candidate. Since 2012, the appointment of
supported court presidents has been frequently denied by Ms Handó, even if they
were applying alone for the position supported by the judges. In these cases, after
an application is repeatedly cancelled, the NJO President commissions someone as
interim president for one year. During this year the interim president received support
from the central administration, which made it clear for the judges how to vote at the
next election if they want to have better working conditions, new judicial positions
and a reasonable caseload.
From mid-2016 onwards there have been signs of growing tension between judges
and the court administration. Some members of the Council from the central region
started to oppose and disagree with the NJO President regarding the allocation
of judicial positions. In some cases, the Council was not supporting the deviation
from the judicial self-governing bodies, and therefore the NJO President annulled
the judicial applications. Where the presidential applicants were critical of her, she
refused to appoint them. For example, the President of the Metropolitan Court, Mr
Sándor Fazekas, applied as single candidate to continue in the position for another
6 years with the support of 70% of judges. However, he was also member of the
Council and had confronted Ms Handó on some occasions, so it was not surprising
that his application was also rejected on 4 January 2018.
On 15 January 2018 elections were held for new members of the National
Judicial Council. The electorate, composed of 130 judges, deliberately voted on
candidates who criticized Ms Handó and were not serving in a high administrative
position subordinate to her. The majority of loyal court leaders applying for
Council membership received a low number of votes. At the same time the judicial
conferences of two courts (including the Metropolitan Court) turned to the newly
elected Council to scrutinize the NJO President’s practise of annulling court leader
and judicial applications. In Spring 2018, the Council was about to meet to discuss
the report of its fact-finding committee when Ms. Handó initiated an extensive attack
against the Council and its members.
From conflict to constitutional crisis
In April 2018, five members of the Council suddenly resigned due to “increased
workload” and “family-related reasons”. Four of the five resigning members were
court leaders and two reported directly to Ms Handó. Many alternate members,
who succeeded the resigning members, refused to take the mandate. Two of them
reported illicit pressure by their court presidents and informally many other resigning
members referred to illicit pressure from the top. When there were only 11 members
left, the NJO President declared the Council illegitimate because not all court levels
were represented, despite this not being part of the legal regulations. The NJO
President soon cut all cooperation with the Council and started to de-legitimize it –
the very body that was supposed to supervise her. The President of the Kúria and
the Minister of Justice, who participates in sessions on consultative rights, declared
that they found the Council to be functioning legitimately. Ms Handó refused to send
any proposals prescribed in law, refused to report to the Council, refused to give
- 3 -
access to administration files, and did not sign the budgetary agreement with the
Council. In June 2018, in an article published by the Institute for Legal Studies of the
Hungarian Academy of Science, I have already formulated that this situation leads to
a constitutional crisis. Since then, the conflict has worsened.
Members of the Council have become targets of the government-friendly media
and are attacked through defamatory articles regarding their personal life and
their professional record. Five disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against
members of the Council, but they have been stopped by a regulation which requires
the consent of the Council for disciplinary action to be taken against its members.
Several members were dismissed from professional working groups where they
were experts before, lost their membership in the bar examination committee,
were banned from trainings as lecturers, and participants and their premiums were
decreased or even refused. The NJO President has also proposed a legislation to
weaken the Council and change the composition in her favour.
To substitute the resigned members of the Council, in October 2018 an election was
organized but it was sabotaged primarily by court leaders subordinated to the NJO
President. At the election, preliminary candidates suddenly refused the nomination,
while other judges who would have undertaken the candidacy were prevented
by court leaders from becoming candidates. Many participants expressed their
concern about the ballot not being secret and the vote count not being managed
appropriately. This scandalous election fraud led to the biggest open protest of
more than 300 judges, supported by the Hungarian Association of Judges (MABIE).
Following this, the NJO President and their subordinate court presidents escalated
persecution, of Council members as well as members of MABIE.
Based on a detailed report the Council turned to the legislative branch, the
Parliament, and proposed the dismissal of the NJO President. This allowed the
Government to solve the problem by dismissing the head of judicial administration
who led the judiciary into this crisis. However, political loyalty seemed to be more
important than the legality and stability of the judicial system as the Parliament –
without debate – refused to dismiss Ms Handó, and with this the Hungarian Judiciary
was captured by the legislation. After these series of events it seems unavoidable
that Hungarian judges who fear persecution and are subject to threats against their
independence – similar to their Polish and Romanian colleagues – will seek aid
and justice before the CJEU, even if they are aware of the fact, that the ‘rule of law
backsliding’ cannot be stopped by the Court of Justice alone.
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